The ICC can also call on experts from disciplines such as economics, trade, accounting and international trade to support its investigation. The DG also has the power to carry out raids at dawn. The ICC and THE DG can often do so and do so for companies outside India. The ICC also has the power to investigate and limit anti-competitive acts or agreements outside India, but to have an AAEC in India. The restriction of the customer to which a buyer is authorized to sell a product may be prohibited as an “exclusive distribution agreement” or “refusal of contract” if this causes or is likely to be the cause of an AAEC in India. For example, Autopart`s CCI has sanctioned several OEMs for entering into vertical agreements with their dealers, preventing dealers from delivering original spare parts to third parties. At Vivo, the ICC found no objection to a clause preventing distributors from making sales to corporate customers without the seller`s prior approval or written consent. Not only were there no documentary documents supporting these allegations, but the ICC also seems to have understood that this restriction was necessary to guarantee the authenticity of the sale of the business (rather than preventing it altogether). If for commercial reasons (for example. B to introduce a new product or to maintain the integrity of the distribution channel) justify the imposition of such a restriction, the ICC could generally take into account the efficiency gains resulting from these restrictions, as well as other factors that may reduce the likelihood of market lockdown (e.g. B, low market share or limiting the duration of the restriction).
It is only when a contextual assessment has a “sufficiently damaging” effect on competition (or the absence of credible welfare virtues) that an agreement can be considered an “object” within the meaning of Article 101, paragraph 1, of the EUTF.  Ghanshyam Dass Vij`s ICC reviewed and rejected allegations of territorial restrictions and the maintenance of an exclusive distribution system (see question 28), as the supplier that imposed the restrictions did not have sufficient market power and the presence of other players did not affect competition between brands in the fmCG sector. The European Commission`s vertical restriction guidelines provide that vertical restrictions are generally less harmful than horizontal restrictions and can provide considerable flexibility in terms of efficiency gains in the market . The European Commission (“EC”) has occasionally interpreted the concept of “agreement” to a large extent. In Bayer AG/. The Commission told the EC that a restriction under Article 101 needed to be reviewed so that the restriction in question would be the “agreement of will” between two parties. There is therefore no need to enter into a written agreement between the parties. In addition, Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. The Commission has found that Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not provide for a distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements and applies to all agreements that distort competition in the market .
In addition, countries such as the United Kingdom and Singapore do not distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements. Vertical restrictions are prohibited only if the ICC concludes, upon request, that they may be the origin of or originally an AAEC in India. To cover this burden, the ICC is required to balance the likely competitive advantages with potential anti-competitive damage resulting from a vertical restriction. Among the likely anti-competitive damages that the ICC can examine are: Vertical AGREEMENTS- Vertical agreements are agreements between two or more companies operating at different production levels2.