Beyond the attempt to limit sales of Japanese chips in the United States, American manufacturers have demanded warranties on a certain share of the Japanese semiconductor market. However, U.S. companies have not been able to mention specific trade barriers that restrict the entry of U.S. computer chips into Japan. Nevertheless, they claimed that the structure of the Japanese market or Japanese trade practices unfairly restrict the sale of products manufactured in the United States. This was a plausible claim, as a large number of Japanese informal trade practices and relationships make foreign products very difficult to compete with in Japan. In addition, between 1987 and 1989, the markets for bipolar digital and analog components accounted for nearly 50% of U.S. semiconductor sales in Japan. These devices are obsolete and there is a very small market for them in the United States. This is a serious problem, concludes Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter. He writes that the U.S. semiconductor industry says it is ready to lift trade restrictions on Ram chips when the 1986 deal expires in September. But industry lobbyists say they want to maintain state restrictions on other chips and maintain a mechanism to hit protective measures on semiconductors when U.S.
industry demands help. In other words, they want force to be able to revive the consumer. American competitors. Today, the U.S. semiconductor industry is divided into three levels of competition. In the lead, some very large companies that manufacture semiconductors as well as some finished products such as calculators and mobile phones. These include Motorola Corporation and Texas Instruments Corporation. There are several small and medium-sized enterprises, including Intel Corporation and National Semiconductor Corporation, that manufacture a variety of semiconductors. At the bottom are dozens of small businesses that have gained a market niche by producing only one or a few quality products at competitive prices. (Many critics of the U.S.
industry complain that large producers spend more money and time lobbying Congress to facilitate imports and chasing each other than they prepare for international competition. See, for example, “A Chip Maker`s Profit on Patents: Texas Instruments Angers Industry,” New York Times, October 16, 1990, p. D1.) 3) Determine the price at which Japanese companies sell semiconductors in collaboration with the U.S. government; Some U.S. semiconductor manufacturers and their supporters in the government have argued that direct support from the U.S. government is in addition to trade restrictions for foreign competitors if the U.S. industry is to remain competitive. They argue that the free market of the semiconductor industry has failed and that the emerging international economy needs state leadership. To avoid such a situation, the Bush administration may well order the Department of Commerce or the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the negative effects of the semiconductor cartel on U.S. computer manufacturers. More detailed data could provide important ammunition in the fight for free trade and protectionism, preventing counterproductive economic policies such as the semiconductor deal in the future.
“Voluntary” restrictions. The U.S. government responded to these complaints in 1986 and threatened to take legal action against Japanese companies that sell computer chips in the United States unless the Japanese government “voluntarily” agrees to a number of trade restrictions. . . .